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Introduction
Scholars of constitutional law located in law schools inevitably gravitate toward
the courts. For us, what the courts say about the Constitution is at the heart of our
constitutional order.2 Not surprisingly, then, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld3 received a great deal of scholarly attention. Hamdan’s rhetoric reinforced its
assertion of the centrality of the courts in the constitutional order.4 And yet, Hamdan
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This is true even as we acknowledge the existence of aspects of the constitutional order

that lie beyond the ken of the courts. We relegate those aspects to the margins of our
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may be more important for what it says about the political aspects of the constitutional
order. On analysis, Hamdan changed the political dynamics associated with the law of
emergency powers without changing the legal terrain (as conventionally understood) one
whit.5 In doing so the decision – and, more important, the political reaction to the
decision – helps us understand the way in which the constitutional law of emergency
powers is (primarily) political rather than legal.
The substantive law of emergency powers specifies what the executive can do to
whom when there are rationally indisputable major threats to the continued stable
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operation of a democratic nation’s political and social order.6 My argument turns on the
proposition, not difficult to establish in my view, that Hamdan deals solely with the
procedural law of emergency powers, that is, with the mechanisms by which the
executive obtains substantive authorities. All that Hamdan holds is that no statute
authorized the President to establish military tribunals with the characteristics laid out in
the President’s order, to try persons held as unlawful combatants.7 Without a statute
authorizing such tribunals, the Court held, the President could establish only tribunals
with characteristics that satisfied the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.8 It is apparent on the face of the Hamdan opinions—that is, Justice John
Paul Stevens’s majority opinion on most issues, his plurality opinion on another, and
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion concurring in the result on the latter—that Congress
could authorize the creation of the tribunals the President had created, without running
into any objections expressly identified in Hamdan.9
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What Hamdan did, of course, was to change one aspect of the status quo.10 After
the decision as before, the President could have used existing court-martial procedures as
the basis for the rules governing trials of unlawful combatants. But after the decision,
unlike the situation before it, the President had to obtain congressional authorization for
the creation of military tribunals that departed from the requirements of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and, perhaps, Common Article 3.11 Initially, the administration
appeared to believe that doing so would be relatively simple. It turned out to be a bit
more complicated, and for reasons that illuminate what I call the political constitution of
emergency powers.
I. HAMDAN IN THE SUPREME COURT
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The facts and holdings of Hamdan are well-known, and I summarize only the
portion of the Court’s opinion that casts light on the political constitution of emergency
powers. The administration had created military tribunals that, so the Court held, did not
conform to the requirement of Article 21 in the Uniform Code of Military Justice12
(UCMJ) that military tribunals of the sort involved in Hamdan had to comply with the
requirements of the law of war. The Court held that the President lacked congressional
authorization to dispense with compliance with the law of war.13 The administration
claimed that legislation enacted after the UCMJ—the Authorization for the Use of
Military Force14 (AUMF) against Al-Qaeda and those associated with it, and the Detainee
Treatment Act—did provide the requisite authority. The Court disagreed. The AUMF
did not “even hint[] that Congress intended to expand or alter the authorization set forth
in Article 21 of the UCMJ.”15 Nor did the Detainee Treatment Act16 contain language
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bearing on the rules to be used in military tribunals; all it did was assume that such
tribunals existed, and structure the process for reviewing decisions by such tribunals.17
The next question was whether the procedures to be used in the tribunals as then
structured were consistent with the UCMJ. The government relied on a provision in the
UCMJ that required “rules” under the UCMJ to be “uniform insofar as practicable.”18
The Court held that “the ‘practicability’ determination the President has made is
insufficient to justify variances from the procedures governing courts-martial.”19 The
President had specifically found that it was impracticable to conform the rules to those in
ordinary criminal trials in civilian Article III courts,20 but had said nothing about the
practicability of conforming the rules to those used in courts-martial. And, the Court
held, the record before it, standing alone and without any presidential determination to
which deference might be owed, did not show why using court-martial procedures would
be impracticable.21
Legislation might not be needed to overcome this difficulty. A presidential
determination of impracticability might have been sufficient. That was not true of
another aspect of the case. The Court held that, according to the law of war, those in
Hamdan’s position—unlawful enemy combatants—were entitled to the protection of so-
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called Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.22 That article requires, the Court
held, that even such combatants must not be sentenced “without previous judgment by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.”23 The existing military tribunals were not “regularly
constituted courts,” apparently because they were not created through the ordinary
processes by which courts are usually created—that is, by legislation.24 Here too, the
“regular constitution” requirement would seem to be satisfied by legislation creating
tribunals without regard to their characteristics or the procedures used in them. Any law
would do.
What of the “indispensable” judicial guarantees? The Court held that provisions
authorizing denial of access to the prisoner (or his lawyers) of evidence against him were
an indispensable requirement of Common Article 3: “[A]t least absent express statutory
provision to the contrary, information used to convict a person of a crime must be
disclosed to him.”25 Note, though, that this requirement flowed from the UCMJ’s
incorporation of the law of war. Congress could displace the law of war and expressly
authorize tribunals that did indeed dispense with some procedures “recognized as
22
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indispensable by civilized peoples,” although one can imagine that there might be some
political obstacles to doing so in terms that acknowledged the departures from such
procedures: Congress would have to say that it was properly removing itself from the
community of civilized peoples, and might be reluctant to do so.26
Hamdan, then, turned entirely on the proposition that Congress had not authorized
the President to create tribunals with characteristics that departed from those required by
the law of war.27 It said nothing about what procedures, if any, the Constitution required
in such tribunals. The Bush administration proposed legislation that would have
authorized it to conduct tribunals different only in trivial respects from those it had
devised on its own.28 Had such a statute been enacted, Hamdan’s holding would not
threaten the tribunals’ operation. Yet, the initial reaction to the administration’s proposal
from important political actors was quite hostile, on the asserted ground that the proposal
could not survive in court. So, for example, Senator John Warner, who had served as
26
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Secretary of the Navy and was on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said, “I feel
this bill has got to pass what I call the federal court muster, so this thing doesn’t get
tangled up in the courts again and go all the way to the Supreme Court, and then down
she goes again.”29 This might perhaps refer to constitutional problems other than those
addressed in Hamdan, with Senator Warner concerned that, for example, non-separationof-powers objections to the tribunals’ procedures might lead the courts to invalidate those
procedures. Shortly after Hamdan, though, Senator Warner had been unambiguous, and
his later statement probably tracked his earlier views: “We’ve got to structure his law in
such a way that if it ever came back up through the Supreme Court, it will not be struck
down. . . . It’s important for the credibility of the United States to put this issue at rest
and let the world realize we’re affording them the protections as the Supreme Court
outlined.”30
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If, as I have argued, the Supreme Court had in fact not “outlined” any procedures
in Hamdan, what were these references about? I suggest that they reflected an intuitive
presumption, widely shared but readily displaced, that constitutional law as articulated by
the Supreme Court provides the only legal framework—that is, the only framework
larger than the particulars of specific statutes—for structuring emergency powers. As the
debate over creating military tribunals developed, that presumption disappeared. Senator
Warner, along with Senators Lindsay Graham and John McCain, advanced their views
about the procedures the tribunals should use on the merits. They quickly stopped
suggesting that the procedures they preferred had been, or would be, required by the
Supreme Court, and shifted to asserting that those procedures were, in their view, the
ones that ought to be used, without reference to adjudicated constitutional law.31 At that
moment, the political constitution replaced the legalized one.
As events turned out, these Senators’ policy preferences with respect to
procedures were relatively weak. The statute that was eventually adopted gave the
President almost as much as he had sought initially.32 The defendant might get access to
31
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some items of evidence that the administration’s initial proposal would have denied him,
and the administration certainly lost the power to decide, entirely at its own discretion,
which evidence would be withheld. But, one might be skeptical about the extent to
which military prosecutors would actually have withheld much more than the newly
enacted statute allows them to withhold.
III. HAMDAN AND THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF EMERGENCY POWERS
The Hamdan decision and its aftermath illustrates what I call the political
constitution of emergency powers, by which I mean nothing more elaborate than (a) that
the way in which emergency powers are structured in a well-functioning democracy is a
matter of fundamental importance, (b) that the way in which they are structured is at least
as much a product of the fundamental structures of political power – the distribution of
authority between executive and legislature, only a small part of which flows from the
Constitution’s texts or judicial precedents—as it is of judicially interpreted law, and (c)
that these structures are as permanent as those found in the Constitution’s written text.
The role of the courts in a constitution of emergency powers structured importantly by
political interactions between executive and legislature is, I suggest, a secondary or
collateral issue, important only in some circumstances.33

commissions authorized by the Military Commissions Act differ from the military
commissions the administration initially established).
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than to the political structures more directly. Judicial capacity concerns permeate
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Discussions of the issues addressed here frequently advert to Justice Robert
Jackson’s concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case,34 and I will as well. The opinion
divided separation of powers problems into three categories. From the perspective
opened up by the idea of a political constitution of emergency powers, though, there is
only a single category. I take as my opening text the second category, dealing with
situations in which Congress had neither granted to nor withheld power from the
President:
[T]here is a zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. . . . In this area,
any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.35
One can treat the term test as modestly ambiguous. Justice Jackson appeared to
offer his formulation as a test the courts could use to determine whether the President’s
action in this twilight zone was constitutionally permissible, although it is manifestly
unsuitable as a judicially administrable test.36 We can learn more from Justice Jackson if
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we treat him as referring to contests of power between President and Congress. That is,
when Congress and the President have concurrent power, the law we end up with results
from “the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables.” I suggest that this is
equally true in the other two categories. That is, the outcome of any (con)test of power is
likely to depend on the interplay of contingent political forces far more than on whatever
constitutional interpretations the courts—or anyone else—offers.
The Hamdan episode is one in which contingent political forces shifted the
problem from the third category, involving a congressional prohibition, to the first,
congressional authorization. The reason is straight-forward: Shortly before a mid-term
election in which the prospects for the President’s party appeared likely to turn solely on
defining a sharp difference between the position taken by his party and that taken by most
Democrats on the issue of addressing terrorism, no Republican, even those who initially
expressed concerns about expansive assertions of presidential power, had much of an
interest in actually curbing that power.37 Most Republicans agreed with the President on
the merits, and those who did not needed no more than a bit of cover, provided by
characterizing the resulting legislation as a “compromise” between them and the
President. And, given the political circumstances, Democrats were unwilling to use the
relatively limited political resources they had to fight on this battleground, believing that
others presented more favorable prospects. So, in the end, Congress authorized the
37
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President to conduct military tribunals using procedures not dramatically different from
those found unauthorized in Hamdan.38
There is, though, an additional part of the story, which is not irrelevant to what
follows in my analysis. Some aspects of the new statute are clearly constitutionally
vulnerable.39 Resolving the constitutional challenges will take some time, during which
the array of political power might change. In particular, the administration in place in
2009 and thereafter might have a different set of policy positions, and face a different set
of political constraints, than the present administration. What actually happens at that
point may differ from what the statute appears to authorize. And, because practice plays
a large role in determining what constitutional law in this area is, we may not know for a
while what the constitutionally mandated or permissible distribution of authority between
President and Congress is.
38
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than the Military Commissions Act is.
39

For an initial analysis, which argues that the constitutionally vulnerable provisions

should be interpreted so as to conform to the Constitution, and that the provisions can
fairly be so interpreted, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
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Suppose Congress had in fact imposed—or, as will turn out to be relevant,
purported to impose—substantial limits on the President’s preferred procedures in the
military tribunals. The President might of course have vetoed the legislation, citing both
policy arguments for the procedures he preferred and constitutional objections to
congressional specification of procedures. Those constitutional objections would rest on
the proposition that the manner in which the military dealt with those it held as enemy
combatants in the midst of an ongoing conflict was essentially a question of military
tactics committed by the Constitution to the President in his capacity as Commander-inChief.40 In the political conditions of fall 2006, though, a veto was unlikely because,
without real talent and luck in presenting the position to the public, a veto would place
the President (and Republicans) in a position of delaying the start of the military
tribunals.
Alternatively, the President might have signed the statute and announced his
intention to disregard its unconstitutional restrictions on presidential power, openly
inviting a judicial challenge to his actions. Note that, structurally, this would simply
replicate the pre-Hamdan situation: There would be a statute on the books, and a pending
legal challenge that might be resolved against the President. Until that challenge was
resolved, the status quo would be, again, the status quo pre-Hamdan: enemy combatants
held without access to a military tribunal. Nor could we be confident that the
constitutional challenge would be resolved quickly on the basis of the Hamdan precedent,
40
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because, as I have argued, Hamdan says nothing about the constitutional distribution of
substantive power between President and Congress.41
Now, suppose that—one, two, or more years from now—the courts definitively
resolve the constitutional questions against the President. What happens next? Not
necessarily the implementation of the (hypothesized) statutory procedures. A President
in a weak political position would of course have to implement those procedures, as
would a President (remember, we might be dealing with the person in office in 2009 or
after) who agreed that the congressionally prescribed procedures were good policy.
What, though, of a President who both rejected those procedures and was in a strong
political position? Such a President would, I am sure, propose new legislation to deal
with enemy combatants, and might obtain it because of the political strength of his or her
position.
To return to Justice Jackson’s analysis, I have argued that the way in which tests
of power are resolved when Congress purports to restrict the President’s powers is
indistinguishable from the way in which they are resolved in the “zone of twilight.”
Everything will “depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables,”
not “law” in the usual sense. Or, put another way, and as I would prefer, the interplay of
events and contemporary imponderables—that is, politics—is constitutional law in this
domain.
One can fairly ask, though, why the analysis I have outlined should be called
constitutional rather than (merely) political. The answer, I believe, is that the analysis of
how politics operates rests on aspects of the nation’s political structure—some rooted in
41

See text accompanying notes --- supra.
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the Constitution, others not—that are as recalcitrant to change as any provisions written
into the Constitution. Or, put another way, we know that constitutional change occurs
without changes in constitutional text—either by judicial interpretation or through the
processes of informal “amendment” or development that scholars such as Bruce
Ackerman and David Strauss have identified.42 Many of us, though of course not all, are
comfortable in calling these changes constitutional rather than merely political because
we believe that the outcomes are as fixed in our political order as are outcomes written
into the constitutional text—that is, not unrevisable (as the Constitution’s written
provisions are formally revisable by amendment pursuant to Article V), but recalcitrant to
change.
III. THE POLITICS OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
What, then, are the underlying constitutional structures out of which the politics I
have discussed emerge?43 Two are obvious: the regular election cycle, and the general

42
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REV. 1457, 1461 (2001) (“formal constitutional amendments of the kind Article V
envisions” are only “incidental to the main processes of constitutional change.”).
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Essay is part of a larger project on the relation between politics and emergencies in
political theory and practice, including the practice of parliamentary systems.
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idea of separation of powers.44 Some issues, varying depending on the surrounding
social and political conditions, get thrust to the fore as an election approaches. So, for
example, national anti-crime legislation got to the top of the political agenda in election
years when the public perceived crime to be rising. And, today, we can expect legislation
related to terrorism to be pushed to the top of the agenda in election years. Hamdan
provided the occasion for proposing some terrorism-related legislation in 2006, but I am
confident that, had Hamdan not been decided, or had it been decided in a way not
inducing the President to propose legislation, nonetheless some terrorism-related
legislation would have been put forward.45
At the most abstract level, separation of powers is about the political Constitution.
The general account of separation of powers offered in The Federalist, for example,
treats politics as the mode in which separation of powers operates, with ambition set
against ambition.46 Everyone knows, of course, that the Founders’ specific vision of
44
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describe the regular election cycle as an aspect of the general separation of powers.
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Some modest support for this proposition is the administration’s effort to obtain

legislative authorization for its program of surveillance of certain cross-border
communications, operated by the National Security Agency. Hamdan induced the
administration to place greater weight behind legislation authorizing military
commissions; I suspect that, in the absence of Hamdan, equivalent weight would have
been placed behind the surveillance legislation.
46
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ambition countering ambition no longer describes separation of powers in the modern
constitutional system, essentially because of the unanticipated – or at least undesired –
rise of political parties.47 And yet, it is easy enough to insert political parties into the
general separation of powers system, and focus on the ways in which politicians’ relation
to their political party, and to their opponents’, provides some structure for political
contention over who should exercise how much power in what circumstances.
The reason is this: as an analytic matter, there might be a large number of ways in
which political parties areintegrated into political systems, but deeply embedded practices
in the United States dramatically reduce the number of possibilities. Nearly every
jurisdiction uses a one-member-per-district, plurality winner rule of selecting the winner
of an election. Such a rule encourages the development of no more than two parties.48
Another practice, which emerged early, is that presidential elections are to be resolved in
national campaigns, not through the selection of local notables by each state’s electors, to
be followed by selection of the President by the House of Representatives. These two
practices push strongly in the direction of having a relatively small number of nationally
organized parties.
Within the general category of nationally organized political parties we can
observe some more specific variants. Historically, the national political parties in the
47

Daryl Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L.
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United States have been coalitions of local parties held together by a common interest in
obtaining disparate policies from the national government.49 To see how national parties
can be coalitions of disparate groups, consider a simplified example, in which there are
only two issues that are not strongly related to each other—domestic industrial policy and
foreign policy, perhaps. One party contains advocates of a strongly interventionist
national government in domestic affairs, the other a laissez faire faction. What of those
who care more about foreign than domestic policy—the isolationists and the
multilateralists? It might happen, perhaps because of the choices specific political
leaders make, perhaps by chance, that Party A becomes committed to a strongly
interventionist domestic program and an isolationist foreign policy, Party B to laissez
faire and multilateralism. Strong isolationists who, all things considered, would prefer
laissez faire domestic policies might end up voting for Party A because they care more

49

See EVERETT CARLL LADD, JR. & CHARLES D. HADLEY, TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE
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to “mobilize varying segments of the electorate through diverse appeals across a series of
axes of conflict.”) One overarching policy, which held parties together for a long time, is
patronage: You might disagree with your party allies on many issues, but combine with
them to gain control of the national government and the jobs at its disposal.
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about getting an isolationist foreign policy than they do about getting a laissez faire
domestic policy.50
Political parties need not be coalitions, though. They might be ideologically
unified, as has been increasingly the case in recent decades, more so, or more quickly, for

50

Of course this example is based on what national political parties have been through

most of U.S. history. In the modern era, for example, the Democratic Party was a
coalition between Northern urban liberals and Southern racial conservatives, held
together in part by patronage and in part by commitments in both factions, though with
different degrees of strength, to domestic economic policies requiring national legislative
action—supporting agricultural production in the South, manufacturing in the North. See
A. JAMES REICHLEY, THE LIFE OF THE PARTIES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
PARTIES 253-54 (1992) (describing the components of the New Deal coalition); LADD &
HADLEY, supra note ---, at 12934 (describing Southern support for New Deal programs).
And the Republican Party joined northeastern internationalists and Midwestern
isolationists in a coalition held together by a commitment to domestic policies motivated
by a nervousness about the expansion of government during the New Deal and after. See
REICHLEY, supra, at ---.
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the Republican Party than for the Democrats.51 Whether parties are coalitions or
ideologically unified affects the operation of the modern separation of powers system.52
Suppose we consider the political constitution along two dimensions, one
involving the structure of the party system and the other whether the national government
is under unified or divided party control.53 The political constitution of emergency
powers will typically generate different outcomes in each of the relevant categories.
51

See William G. Mayer, The Divided Democrats: Ideological Unity, Party Reform, and

Presidential Elections (1996) (arguing that Democrats have found it more difficult to
maintain party unity than Republicans).
52

I do not discuss here in any detail some of the features of that system’s operation when

one party is ideologically unified and the other is a coalition, although I will mention
some in passing. Nor will I devote attention to the effects of partially divided
government, that is, one in which one party controls the presidency and one but not both
houses of Congress.
53

Actually divided government can occur even when the government is nominally

unified, if the minority party in Congress is able to use procedural devices such as the
filibuster in the United States Senate that have the effect of imposing supermajority
requirements (where the required supermajority is larger than the actual one). I note,
though, that a device that is formally available may not be politically available in some
circumstances, as the controversy over the use of a filibuster on judicial nominations, and
its resolution through a compromise whose strength has not yet been tested,
demonstrates. See Byron York, “Dr. Frist’s Operation: How the Senate Majority Leader
Played a Game of Filibuster Chicken,” National Rev., June 20, 2005 (describing how the
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The classical version of separation of powers—again, ambition countering
ambition—will arise when we have divided government with ideologically unified
parties.54 Not the interests of the man but the interests of the party will be conjoined to
the interests of the place, as a President and his supporters in Congress seek to advance
presidential prerogatives against the resistance of a unified competing party in

Republican threat of the “nuclear option” constrained Democratic use of the filibuster).
Similarly, Democrats formally had the power to filibuster the military tribunals
legislation, but were constrained politically to refrain from doing so.
54

In what follows I focus entirely on the way in which parties operate within the

institutions of national government. Political scientists distinguish between the “party-ingovernment,” my concern here, and the “party-in-the-electorate,” those who support the
party at election time. See, e.g., V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE
GROUPS 163-65 (1964). (Key also identifies the “party-as-organization,” those who run
the party’s operations on a daily basis.) The reason I focus on the “party-in-government”
is that it is the mechanism by which the modern separation-of-powers systems works.
Ultimately, of course, there is some relation between those who form the party-ingovernment and their constituents in the party-in-the-electorate, but that relation is a
complex one, including such features as gerrymandering (which loosens the control some
constituents in the party-as-electorate have over their representative), and I do not have
even preliminary thoughts on the way in which the relation between the party-in-theelectorate and the party-in-government affects the operation of separation of powers.
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Congress.55 Contests will be resolved by the balance of political forces, with each side
deploying the weapons available to it in political contention: internal legislative rules to
obstruct or structure the progress of a proposal through Congress, congressional oversight
hearings, the rhetorical resources of the presidency, and the like.56
The situation is not dramatically different with divided government and parties
that are coalitions. Added to the mix will be efforts by the supporters of presidential or
congressional prerogative to peel away some members of the party controlling the
presidency or Congress. This will be possible to the extent that the issues that divide and
unite coalitions include either issues about congressional and presidential power as
such,57 or about the specific policy issue that divides the President and the party
55

Even if the competition is only for the moment, with the party controlling Congress

hoping to take over the presidency in the next election. That is, one can expect a party
that strongly defends presidential prerogatives when it controls the presidency but not
Congress to abandon that position if their opponents win the presidency and they take
over Congress.
56

It is probably worth emphasizing that these contests can occur over the entire terrain of

policy. That is, a President who seeks to advance a specific national security agenda may
be forced to make concessions with respect to that agenda because his opponents threaten
to thwart his ability to implement some policy unrelated to national security.
57

In this configuration, we might describe a “presidential party” consisting of political

officials in the executive branch and some members of Congress, and a “congressional
party” consisting almost entirely of members of Congress, although perhaps with some
allies in the executive branch. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF
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controlling Congress.58 Again, the contest will be resolved politically, although we can
expect the President to prevail somewhat more often here than in the prior scenario
because the party controlling Congress will have to expend more political resources to
bring enough members of the President’s party to their side than they have to do when
they are ideologically unified in opposition to the President.
The President’s prospects improve further when there is unified government with
parties that are coalitions, although presidential success is not guaranteed. The reason is

DEMOCRACY: FOUR-PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 241-64 (1963) (arguing that both major
parties are divided into presidential and congressional and presidential parties, each of
which has distinctive interests and tendencies).
For completeness, I should mention also the possibility that some of those who
work in the executive bureaucracy might act as members of the congressional party or
even the opposition party (for example, by leaking information for political purposes).
For an argument that contemporary legal analyses fail to take the political and legal role
of bureaucrats seriously enough, see EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING
THE MODERN STATE (2005).
58

That is, it does not matter much whether, for example, a Congress controlled by

Democrats opposes presidential power as such or a Republican President’s policies about
military tribunals, as long as some Republicans in Congress care about either
congressional power or oppose the President’s policies on the merits.
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that there is some chance that the minority party may be able to pull away enough
members of the President’s (coalitional) party for them to prevail on specific issues.59
The final category is unified government with ideologically organized parties—
our present condition.60 Here the President gets what he asks for, as in the Military
Commissions Act.61 Is this a matter of concern for the political constitution of
emergency powers? If one thought that the classical separation of powers model required
outcomes that represented compromises between presidents and Congress, one might find
this troubling. But, I wonder whether it should be troubling as a matter of constitutional
design, for two reasons. There is no particular reason to think that unified government
with ideologically organized parties is a permanent condition, and if it is not, whatever
might be troubling about the current situation may disappear. More important, it is
59

In the most general terms, this describes the development of national domestic policy

during the presidency of John F. Kennedy and the first years of the presidency of William
J. Clinton, when Democrats also controlled Congress but were unable to enact the full
presidential agenda because the minority Republicans obtained enough votes from
Democrats to block presidential initiatives. [Please provide citations].
60

Or, perhaps, unified government with the majority party being ideologically coherent

and the minority being a coalitional party (or closer to being one than to being
ideologically coherent).
61

Military Commissions Act of 2006, S. 3930, 109th Cong. (enrolled as agreed to or

passed by both House and Senate, Sept. 29, 2006). Perhaps more accurately, the
Republican Party is largely unified ideologically, and dissidents on some issues such as
Senator Arlen Specter are not so disaffected as to fight their party too strenuously.
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entirely unclear that the classical version of separation of powers required any substantive
outcomes at all, and in particular whether it envisioned compromises between President
and Congress over the division of power. It may be—I believe it is—that the legalized
Constitution contemplated that all separation of powers issues would fall in Justice
Jackson’s second category. If so, whatever the political process produces is what the
Constitution requires (or permits, if you prefer).62
I believe that the current configuration of political power fuels some of the more
feverish expressions supporting a strong judicial role in assessing the constitutionality of
recent executive and legislative initiatives. Yet, wholly apart from concerns one might
have the courts’ capacity to do a decent job,63 I wonder whether it makes sense to design
our constitutional structures to deal with a relatively new and perhaps temporary
configuration of political power. Or, put another way, as a matter of abstract principle it
might make sense to preserve a strong role for the courts in this configuration of political
power, but it seems to me quite difficult to design a judicially administrable doctrine that

62

On this view, the distribution of power between Congress and President is an issue like

the selection of the highest marginal rate for the income tax, something to be determined
entirely by politics (with perhaps some caveat about ensuring that the result falls within
some very wide boundaries). I develop this analysis in Tushnet, supra note [Law and
Prudence]
63

Either because they will be unduly intrusive on those initiatives even though they lack

information and expertise, or because they will be unduly deferential to those initiatives –
for, I suppose, exactly the same reasons.
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will say, “Last year you properly played a strong role, but this year, after the elections
changed things, you can’t.”
So far I have discussed the two dimensions—the composition of government and
the composition of the parties—in rather skeletal terms. I turn now to some slightly more
detailed propositions, primarily to indicate how some flesh might be put on the bones of
the account without insisting that the details I sketch are completely accurate. Consider
first what might happen immediately after provocations that the President describes as
triggering the need for emergency power. Political scientists have described a “rally
round the flag” effect, which in all party configurations increases support for the
President.64 In the terms I have used, the “rally round the flag” effect may push the
political system toward unified government.65 Political scientists also observe, though,
that this effect dissipates, and the provocation’s size might affect the size of the effect and
the speed with which it dissipates. A formally divided government might seem more
unified for a while, then revert to its prior divided state.
Second, assume that we are in one of the configurations of power in which some
degree of congressional ambition seeks to counter presidential ambition.66 How might
64

See, e.g., Marc J. Hetherington & Michael Nelson, Anatomy of a Rally Effect: George

W. Bush and the War on Terrorism, PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS (Jan. 2003) p. 37
(describing the effect and providing references to the political science literature).
65

I thank Adrian Vermeule for this observation.

66

I put it this way primarily for expository convenience. I believe that there is a sense

among commentators that emergencies trigger executive initiatives—executive
ambition—to which legislatures respond. That may be so in general, but I believe that
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the politics of that confrontation play itself out? Some suggest that the President has a
systematic advantage over Congress.67 The executive branch is nominally unified under
the President, and so can develop a single position, whereas Congress has many members
who seek to advance both a general view and more parochial interests. The President has
readier access to relevant information than Congress does, and can keep the information
secret even from Congress.68 Finally, the President can act quickly, whereas Congress
takes time to deliberate and enact legislation.
One might wonder, though, about whether these characteristics give the President
much of an advantage over Congress, except in the very short run. It is easy to
exaggerate the unity within the executive: It is part of the folk-lore of Washington, for
example, that the Department of State and the Department of Defense are regularly at
odds over the proper response to external threats. Leaks from within the executive
much depends on the prior state of executive-legislative power relations, and that
analytically we should be alert to the possibility that initiatives might emerge from an
energized legislature, to be countered by executive ambition.
67

See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note ---, at 47 (including among the

“institutional disadvantages” of Congress “lack of information about what is happening”
and “inability to act quickly and with one voice”), 170 (“congressional deliberation is
slow and unsuited for emergencies. Congress has trouble keeping secrets and is always
vulnerable to obstructionism at the behest of members of Congress who place the
interests of their constituents ahead of those of the nation as a whole.”).
68

See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (in foreign affairs,

the President “has his confidential sources of information”).
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bureaucracy are common, and not always at the behest of the President. Specialized
committees and their professional staff members can over time acquire expertise and
information equivalent to, or exceeding, that of the President’s political appointees and
employees in the executive bureaucracy. Congress can organize itself to engage in realtime oversight of executive operations, and at least has attempted to do so by requiring
that the President notify a select group of congressional leaders of some operations.69
Focusing on oversight rather than legislation brings an additional consideration
into view. Congress and the President interact regularly, and on a large range of issues.
Repeat players, including the President, have to keep the entire playing field in mind. A
President who capitalizes on a momentary advantage with respect to a particular
emergency-related issue might find himself facing retaliation, not over emergency-related
issues, but over nominations to unrelated executive positions or over some purely
domestic program.
None of this is to say that claims about the President’s advantages in emergencies
are entirely mistaken, but only that one can easily overstate them and, in particular,
overestimate the extent to which temporary advantages translate into permanent ones. In
my view, the political configurations I have described—unified versus divided
government, the types of political parties we have—are more important in structuring the
constitution of emergency powers than the differences between the institutional
characteristics of the executive branch and Congress. The preceding pages have tried to
show that the idea of having a political constitution of emergency powers is conceptually
coherent: It allows for analysis at least as systematic as that available when we deal with
69

[cite to be supplied].
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a legalized constitution, and draws upon structures embedded in the written constitution
nearly as firmly as the document’s words themselves.
Conclusion
Is the political constitution of emergency powers that we seem to have
normatively attractive? To some extent one cannot answer that question without
addressing the most general questions about the attractiveness of a legalized constitution:
How often, and on what issues of how much importance, will courts enforce the legalized
constitution appropriately (from one’s own normative perspective)?70 To the extent that
narrower questions are possible, I would observe that the political constitution of
emergency powers deals with who as between President and Congress gets to make
substantive decisions. It does not deal with whether those decisions, once made, are
consistent with what I earlier called substantive constitutional norms, most importantly
the individual rights protected by the Constitution. Nor does it deal with the distribution
of decision-making authority between the political branches on the one side and the
courts on the other.71 Senator Specter asserted that the courts would hold
70

The best analysis of which I am aware is Wojciech Sadurski, Judicial Review and the

Protection of Constitutional Rights, 22 OX. J. LEG. STUD. 275 (2002).
71

Except that the political constitution excludes the courts from deciding what the

Constitution prescribes to be the distribution of power between the President and
Congress. That exclusion might result from a definition of what the political constitution
is, or, as I would prefer, from an analysis of the Constitution that produces the conclusion
that the Constitution prescribes no distribution of power at all, but only sets up a
framework of political contestation over that question.
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unconstitutional some of the restrictions on the availability of habeas corpus contained in
the military tribunals statute. He might be right, or he might be wrong, but the political
constitution of emergency powers does leave that constitutional question to the courts.
Similarly with the statute’s provisions dealing with the admissibility of evidence before
such tribunals: The provisions may be unconstitutional in some applications, and the
political constitution of emergency powers allows the courts to so hold. The political
constitution of emergency powers can fit comfortably with a legalized constitution of
individual rights.72
Justice Stevens ended his opinion in Hamdan with a paean to the Rule of Law.73
Many of those who thought that the President’s military commissions were
unconstitutional have similar qualms about the Military Commissions Act.74 But, if

72

The fit might be comfortable, but the entire ensemble might be distasteful to those

who believe that only a fully legalized constitution is likely to be normatively attractive.
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126 S.Ct. at 2798.

74

See Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, “Center for Constitutional Rights

Aruges to Court that Military Commissions Act is Unconstitutional” (Nov. 2, 2006),
available at http://www.ccrny.org/v2/reports/report.asp?ObjID=SHznm0ARDp&Content=881 (visited Nov. 15,
2006); Press Release, Sen Patrick Leahy, Leahy Opposes “Flagrantly Unconstitutional”
Military Commission Bill (Sept. 28, 2006), available at
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200609/092806c.html (visited Nov. 15, 2006).
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Hamdan is a triumph of the Rule of Law, so must be the Military Commissions Act.
(Now apply the logical rule of contraposition.)75

75

That rule is: If P implies Q, then not-P implies not-Q.
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